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Abstract 
 
With the rise of misinformation epidemic, this study 
aims to empirically investigate the consequences of an 
online commenting platform’s activity-capping policy 
on abusers’ and regular users’ activities. Utilizing a 
quasi-experimental setting, we find that restrictive 
policies not only curtail the activity of the abusers but 
also promote the activity of regular users. Results show 
that the policy has an asymmetric effect on abusers and 
regular users— while it effectively reduces the actions 
of the malicious users by 1.8%, it promotes the activities 
of the regular users by 2.2%. To better understand the 
behavioral change of the regular users, we draw from 
the rational economic perspective of voting decisions 
and provide initial evidence that such policy measures 
reinforce the subjective probability of being influential 
on the outcome. This study will provide valuable 
implications to managers and policymakers to estimate 
the consequences of and to combat against malicious 
behaviors and to promote free speech in online 
platforms.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
With the emergence of online communicating 
platforms, people share and gather information from the 
web. While it has allowed the social actors to directly 
exchange their opinions at a little to no cost [20], at the 
same time, it has also allowed the malicious actors to 
spread false information quickly to sway the public's 
views on specific topics [23]. False information and 
politically-biased misinformation on online platforms 
have engendered unprecedented economic and political 
problems throughout the world [12].  
As a mean to control the quality of the contents and 
to dilute the spread of misinformation, many online 
platforms have introduced a way to aggregate opinion – 
with upvoting and downvoting on posts and comments 
[22]. For example, Reddit offers its users to 
upvote/downvote on posts and comments, and its 
relative votes determine the visibility of the posts. Such 
a system improves “digital democracy” [22], but at the 
same time, it provides opportunities for malicious users 
to disseminate information without much friction by 
utilizing upvote/downvote bots and sockpuppets. As 
Muchnik et al. (2013) found, prior rating on 
comments/posts significantly affects how people 
perceive and rate [18]. Thus, attempts to manipulate 
public opinion using upvotes/downvotes have become a 
severe issue to online platforms and their users. 
One straightforward solution for the online 
platforms to fight the misinformation by manipulating 
the popularity of postings is to place restrictions on how 
frequently, easily, and quickly a user influences the 
popularity of the information. Some platforms have 
already adopted such restrictive policy measures that do 
not discriminate between abuser and regular users. For 
instance, WhatsApp introduced a message-forwarding 
cap, that users can only share a message up to five times, 
to curb the overly fast distribution of misinformation 
[8]. Recent scholarly work demonstrates that setting a 
limit on political URLs shared in Twitter effectively 
reduces the fake news spread [7].  
Although an activity cap may help online platforms 
regain social accountability, it may affect the activity 
and traffic levels accrued by users and thus the profit of 
the platforms. As the capping policy symmetrically 
affects both abusers and regular users, it is plausible that 
the capping policy not only reduces the malicious 
actions but also reduces the activity levels of regular 
users. As the activity and traffic levels accrued by users 
are one of the essential metrics for the platform’s profit, 
it is vital to understand the full ramifications of policy 
interventions by examining its impact on the malicious 
users and the regular users. That is, we aim to 
investigate the efficacy of such policy measures in 
restraining malicious activities as well as in suppressing, 
or even bolstering, the regular users' activities.  
While scholarly work in online opinion 
manipulation is growing, current literature focuses on 
the spread of misinformation and discusses ways to 
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restrain malicious activities. Only a handful of studies 
show the platform’s policy on regular users. For 
example, Ma and Agarwal (2007) found that identity 
verification, a form of platform’s abuser-restraining 
measure, increases users’ satisfaction and knowledge 
sharing [16]. However, their work is based on the survey 
data and did not delve into its potential impact on 
regular users. Also, Grinberg et al. (2019) showed the 
effectiveness of setting a limit on political URLs in 
Twitter on fake news spread, but it was based on a 
simulation [7]. To our best knowledge, no study to date 
has empirically examined the consequences of an online 
commenting platform’s capping policy on regular users’ 
activities. This study aims to fill that void by attributing 
the efficacy of the online platform’s policy measure to 
meaningful behavioral changes of regular users.  
We empirically investigate the consequences of a 
deterrence policy on regular users by utilizing a natural 
quasi-experiment setting. To this end, we collaborated 
with one of the largest online platforms in East Asia. 
The platform implemented a deterrence policy during 
our sample period by restricting the number of 
comments and the count of upvotes and downvotes a 
user can cast. We exploit this institutional variation to 
make inferences about the effects of the deterrence 
policy on both abusers and regular users, utilizing 
individual-level log data before and after the policy 
implementation.  
Results show some interesting findings. First, policy 
implementation positively affects the overall activities 
of the voting activities. Second, the policy has an 
asymmetric effect on abusive users and regular users – 
while it effectively reduces the actions of the malicious 
users by 1.8%, it promotes the activities of the general 
users by 2.2%. Third, the policy increases the activities 
of the regular users, regardless of their previous voting 
activities. While the policy shows stronger effect on 
increasing the users with previous voting activities, it 
also effectively attracts users without any voting 
activities to engage in the voting behavior.  
Further, to better understand underlying mechanism 
driving regular users’ behavioral changes, we draw 
upon the rational economic perspective of voting 
decisions by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) [19], and posit 
that the utility of expressing their liking or disliking on 
a given opinion (i.e., comment) as a function of the 
subjective probability of being able to influence the 
popularity of that opinion by up-voting or down-voting 
it, respectively. Based on the fact that a preemptive 
measure against malicious actors employed by a 
platform is likely reinforce, if not strengthen, the belief 
that the voice of regular users will be heard and 
represented accurately due to the expected decrease of 
abusive behaviors in the platform. We support our 
hypothesis by finding some initial evidence that the 
capping policy reinforces the subjective probability of 
being influential on the outcome in the upvote actions.  
Our results contribute to the extant literature of fake 
information and online opinion manipulation and our 
understanding of policy measures to restrain the 
manipulative activities. Reports from the social network 
platforms and popular press have documented the 
potential consequences of such a restrictive policy on 
the dissemination of the fake information. Our study 
focuses on another yet important outcome of such a 
restrictive policy on the regular users’ activity levels. 
Our results indicate that the platform's simple input 
capping policy suppresses only the activities of the 
abusers and instead increases the activities of the regular 
users by strengthening the belief that the voice of regular 
users will be heard and represented accurately due to the 
expected decrease of abusive behaviors in the platform. 
Further, our research provides meaningful managerial 
insights into the online platforms. 
 
2. Opinion manipulation in online platform 
 
Online manipulation has received significant 
attention from researchers since the emergence of online 
communicating platforms. With the proliferation of the 
online platforms which enable sharing of the user-
generated contents, concerns on malicious action and its 
impact on the people's behavior have brought scholarly 
attention in the field. The extant literature on online 
manipulation focuses on product reviews by 
investigating notable characteristics of fake reviews [1], 
detecting fake reviews [3, 9, 11], and examining the 
consequences of the malicious review activities and 
devising potential solutions to suppress deceptive 
reviews [14 ,17]. For example, Anderson and Simester 
(2014) find that fake reviews are more negative and 
contain less explanation about the products [1]. Fake 
review detection research focuses on the formulation of 
detection algorithms, leveraging reviewer information, 
review quality and product attributes [9], reviewer 
characteristics and interactions among them [11], and 
linguistic cues in the review contents [3]. Lastly, a few 
studies have documented potential solution to combat 
deceptive reviews. Mayzlin et al. (2014) found that 
significantly less malicious reviews exist under the 
platform with a verified reviewer feature [17]. Also, 
Lappas et al. (2016) investigates the impact of malicious 
reviews on the ranking of the business shown in the 
platform and provides potential response strategies for 
the attacked business owners [14]. 
Another stream of literature on online manipulation 
focuses on the spread of misinformation in the social 
media and commenting platforms and its consequences. 
A rich set of research focus on the malicious actions of 
social and political bots in social media [5, 10], the 
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impact of the manipulative information [21, 23], and 
how people react to the mal-information [2, 18]. 
Kollanyi et al. (2016) analyze tweets generated during 
the 2016 US presidential election and find that 
automated activities accounts reached up to 27% at its 
peak [10]. Forelle et al. (2014) investigated activities of 
political bots in Venezuela and finds that only a small 
number of bots generate a high volume of retweets [5]. 
Vosoughi et al. (2018) examine the spread of false news 
and find that news with misinformation spreads further 
and faster than the true news [23]. Shao et al. (2018) find 
that automated bots are the leading cause of false 
information spread on Twitter [21]. And lastly, some 
papers look into the consequences of manipulated 
information and automated activities. In their 2013 
paper, Muchnik et al. find that positively biased 
opinions generate positive herding effect while 
negatively biased opinions get people to correct the bias 
[18]. Also, Badawy et al. (2018) find evidence that users 
are vulnerable to malicious activities. People helped to 
share tweets from Russian trolls during the 2016 
election [2]. 
While the negative consequences of online 
manipulation have been well noted by previous 
literature, little research has addressed the strategies to 
mitigate this negative impact. As noted previously, a 
few studies discuss the effectiveness of user verification 
on malicious activities [17] and deterrence policies [7]. 
However, the literature focuses on the impact of such 
policy measures on abuser activities and misinformation 
spread. Only a handful of studies examined the 
consequences of deterring mechanisms on regular users’ 
behavior. Ma and Agarwal (2007) find that identity 
verification of the content generator increases users' 
satisfaction and knowledge sharing [16]. However, their 
work is based on the survey data from the users from the 
online communities. To our knowledge, no study to date 
has empirically examined the consequences of such 
policies on regular users. As more platforms have 
adopted strategies to combat malicious actions, 
practitioners need to understand the impact of these 
strategies on non-malicious users as the volume 
generated by the users is directly linked to the firm 
profit. Thus, more scholarly attention to this topic is 
needed. 
 
3. Conceptual framework  
 
In this study, we aim to empirically investigate the 
effect of the online commenting platform's deterring 
mechanism on regular user activities. Expressly, our 
focal policy targets to limit the volume and the 
frequency of activities from malicious accounts by 
imposing a restriction of the total number of activities 
per account and adds ten-second intermittent pauses or 
delays between activities (e.g., commenting, up-voting, 
down-voting). The pause implemented would 
effectively reduce the activities of the automated bots, 
and the restriction on the total number of activities 
would force attackers to put extra effort and time to 
make more accounts if they want to engage in the 
malicious activities of high volume. Hence, our focal 
policy is expected to ramp up the friction to malicious 
users thus deterring their activities, but at the same time 
it can give rise to either the same level of suppression of 
activity restriction towards regular users or potential 
encouragement to regular users to more engage in the 
platform for the increased authority provided under the 
manipulation deterrence initiative. Thus the 
multifaceted role of the coercive focal policy remains 
still unanswered.  
 
3.1. The calculus of voting 
  
According to the voting decision model developed 
by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), an individual’s 
decision to vote is determined by the following trade-off 
involving four factors:  
P×B+D>C 
where P stands for the subjective probability of 
casting a vote that is pivotal to the election outcome, B 
means perceived benefit one would get if the supporting 
candidate wins, D as the personal satisfaction a voter 
would gain from participating in an election, and C 
representing the cost and effort associated with voting. 
In the context of random utility maximization 
framework, an individual’s decision on whether or not 
to engage in voting depends on the expected benefit the 
individual would get from the action and the cost 
associated with it. Accordingly, a voter would decide to 
vote only if the expected utility (probability x benefit + 
satisfaction from participation) is higher than the cost 
associated with voting [19].  
 We apply this theoretical framework to our 
research context. Similar to the election turnout, users in 
our focal platform determine whether or not to 
participate in the voting activity based on the four 
factors above. As our goal of this research is to see the 
impact of the platform policy on the user activities, we 
assume that B and D are fixed – the perceived benefit of 
promoting/demoting a comment and the benefit from 
participating in the commenting system would not 
change before and after the platform policy 
implementation. We assume that the benefits one would 
get from promoting/demoting a comment roots from the 
comment itself, such as contents and quality of the 
comment. Similarly, satisfaction from participation 
depends on the personal characteristics of the regular 
user. As we have little to believe that the policy change 
is affecting these root causes of both factors, we focus 
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primarily on the remaining two factors – the perceived 
probability of casting a decisive vote and the cost 
associated with voting to develop our hypothesis. We 
first examine the cost posited from the policy 
intervention and then look at the change in the 
subjective probability of casting a decisive vote.  
 
3.2. Cost of the policy intervention 
  
As described before, our focal policy puts a 
restriction on the user activity by limiting the frequency 
and volume of the activities. Restricting the volume of 
the activities may cause an increase in the opportunity 
cost of voting, as it puts votes to become scarce [15]. 
Also, a ten-second pause increases regular users’ time 
cost as they have to spend extra time to participate in the 
voting activities. Thus, we first hypothesize that a 
platform’s policy to control for the input would increase 
the cost of the regular users voting activities. 
 
3.3. Perceived probability of being decisive 
 
The policy may also change the perceived 
probability of being decisive based on the expected 
effectiveness of the policy. Although the extant 
literature on election turnout assumes P as ignorable [6, 
13], we focus on the perceived probability of being 
pivotal for two reasons: first, the online platform 
displays the number of upvotes and downvotes in real-
time, so that users can predict the importance of their 
vote on the outcome. Also, the total number of voters in 
our commenting platform is smaller than the number of 
voters in political elections, and therefore, we cannot 
say that the probability of being decisive is ignorable.  
We hypothesize that the policy intervention would 
increase the regular users' expectation on the 
commenting system efficacy and thus would enhance 
the perceived probability of a vote being decisive. The 
policy against malicious users will strengthen the belief 
that the voice of regular users will be heard and 
represented accurately due to the expected decrease of 
abusive behaviors in the platform. For this reason, 
regular users modify their beliefs on the commenting 
system efficacy and thus alter P. If an individual expects 
that the policy would effectively reduce the malicious 
action, it will increase the perceived probability of 
achieving the goal as the total number of votes on a 
comment would decrease. Hence, we presume that 
policy intervention would effectively increase the 
regular users’ perceived probability of their vote being 
pivotal. Also, we note that the change in belief would be 
heterogeneous across users based on their current 
beliefs, past engagement in voting activities, and other 
individual characteristics. 
 In sum, we expect that a restrictive policy measure 
increases the cost of voting, but also boost the perceived 
probability of being decisive. The contrary impact of the 
policy on two factors of the voting decision model 
makes the regular users’ behavioral change caused by 
the policy intervention an empirical question. 
 
4. Research context and data  
 
4.1. Research context 
 
This paper utilizes the data provided by one of the 
largest online platforms in East Asia. The platform is 
similar to Yahoo! Inc. as it offers various online services 
including search engine, news, email, entertainment, 
finance, shopping, blogs, and online forums. In its news 
platform, users can react with comment posting, and 
upvote or downvote on comments other users had 
posted after reading an article. The platform displays 
comments based on the number of netvotes (number of 
upvotes – number of downvotes). Comments with the 
top five highest netvotes are displayed right below the 
news article with a mobile device, and the comments 
with the top ten highest netvotes are displayed with a 
PC. A screenshot of the commenting system is shown in 
Figure 1.  
In the focal platform, the most prominent and critical 
issue is the political manipulation by clicking "upvote" 
or "downvote" buttons on the comments. An ongoing 
investigation of the political scandal in Korea revealed 
that there had been automated attacks on clicking 
upvotes and downvotes in favor of a particular political 
camp. Thus, to reduce the manipulative actions of 
clicking upvotes and downvotes, the platform 
implemented an input control policy on April 25, 2018, 
at 11 AM. This policy has two components. First, it 
limits the total number of upvotes and downvotes a user 
account can perform to 50 per day, and the total number 
of comments a user account can write to 3 per article. 
Second, it poses a 10-second pause in between clicking 
upvotes and downvotes. As the policy aims to reduce the 
political manipulation activities, it is only valid for 
political news articles.  
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Figure 1. A Screenshot of Comments 
Displayed in the Platform 
 
The platform had provided multiple announcements 
on their policy change. The platform posted an 
announcement about this deterrence policy at the top of 
the commenting system, as shown in Figure 2A. Also, if 
a user tried to vote multiple times with the pause in 
between votes less than 10 seconds or vote over 50 
times, a popup notice about the deterrence policy is 
shown (Figure 2B). Thus, through these 
announcements, we assume that users were aware of the 
policy implementation.  
 
  
Figure 2. Announcements on capping policy  
 
4.2. Data 
 
For this study, we focus on five political news 
articles and five non-political news articles that were 
posted in the platform's online news portal websites on 
April 25, 2018. All the articles were posted before the 
implementation of the platform's policy. The focal 
articles were selected based on the popularity – the top 
5 most viewed political articles and top 5 most viewed 
entertainment articles. We create the following two 
datasets: The first dataset contains the information about 
the comments recorded on the focal articles. After 
reading a news article, users can react with comment 
posting, and upvote or downvote on comments other 
users had posted. A user can upvote or downvote only 
once for each comment. The comment data records 
fields such as pseudo-id of the comment writer, time the 
comment was written, the content of the comment, and 
information about people who responded to the 
comment including their pseudo-ids, timestamps and 
the types of the activities (upvoting or downvoting). 
19,541 comments and 308,767 upvote/downvote clicks 
were recorded for our ten focal articles. A more detailed 
description of the data is presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Focal Articles  
 Posting time 
Comment
s 
Total 
Votes 
Political 1 4/25/18 9:00 7,795 127,008 
Political 2 4/25/18 10:15 476 7,573 
Political 3 4/25/18 8:50 2,178 33,811 
Political 4 4/25/18 9:46 793 15,939 
Political 5 4/25/18 8:47 3,401 44,786 
Entertainment 1 4/25/18 10:15 1,549 31,982 
Entertainment 2 4/25/18 8:34 1,538 11,234 
Entertainment 3 4/25/18 9:05 1,441 30,264 
Entertainment 4 4/25/18 9:19 267 5,743 
Entertainment 5 4/25/18 9:40 103 427 
 
The second dataset contains the complete server log 
files for users who visited the first political article or the 
first entertainment article and spans six hours from 8 
AM to 2 PM on April 25, 2018. This dataset records 
every activity and request the client (user) makes within 
site, including timestamps, URLs the user visited, 
referring URLs, types of requests, and browser and 
device used. The data contain about 53 million 
clickstream records of 680,968 users. 
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One interesting aspect of our data is that it enables 
us to distinguish abuser accounts from regular users. 
The platform identified the accounts that were used for 
manipulation activities based on its own detecting 
mechanism. It flagged user IDs that had clicked 
upvote/downvote more than five times in five minutes 
on a comment made under the same IP and cookie 
information as malicious accounts. Although these 
malicious accounts may not be the full set of the total 
abuser accounts, we argue that the detecting mechanism 
reasonably locates the accounts that had been involved 
in automated actions. Thus, we use the abuser accounts 
flagged by the platform to estimate the effect of the 
policy in this paper. 
Using the first dataset, we construct an individual-
minute level panel data set that contains individual 
voting activities on our ten focal articles. Also, for the 
individuals who had visited the first political article and 
the first entertainment article (Political 1 and 
Entertainment 1), we utilize the second dataset to create 
individual-level voting activities before entering the 
focal articles.  
As mentioned before, the setting of the policy 
implementation brings a quasi-experimental design and 
allows us to causally inference the effect of policy 
implementation on the user activities. To estimate the 
impact of platform’s input control policy on the abuser 
and user activities, we use difference-in-difference 
estimation technique [4, 25]. In order to estimate the 
effect of an intervention using the difference-in-
difference technique, we need observations from a unit 
(in this case, individual) in both pre- and post-policy 
periods. Therefore, we select users who visited both pre- 
and post-policy. We also limit the time bandwidth to 30 
minutes before and after the policy implementation to 
screen out the unobservables that could affect the voting 
behavior. We exclude individuals who visited both the 
focal political and entertainment articles from our 
sample, as they may have been exposed to the 
platform’s policy and thus their behavior afterward may 
be affected by the policy even in the entertainment 
articles. 
In sum, our final sample includes 63,697 individual-
minute level observations from 5,781 individuals. 
Among the individuals in the sample, about 5.2% of the 
accounts were identified as abusers. Summary statistics 
of the data is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics  
Panel A – Number of Individuals in Each Group 
 Control Treatment 
User 1,973 3,506 
Abuser 26 276 
Panel B -  Summary Statistics 
 Mean S. Dev Min Max 
Ind(Treatment) 0.6377 0.4807 0 1 
Ind(Post-Policy) 0.5123 0.4999 0 1 
Ind(Abuser) 0.0779 0.2680 0 1 
Log(activity+1) 0.1065 0.4160 0 3.9512 
# Obs 63,697 
 
5. Empirical analysis and results  
 
5.1. Difference-in-difference-in-difference 
 
5.1.1. Difference-in-difference-in-difference. We 
begin our empirical analysis by aiming to examine 
whether the impact of the policy varies on abusers and 
regular users. In order to estimate the effect, we use the 
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) 
specification. The DDD estimate of policy intervention 
is estimated by: 
(1) 𝑌"# = 	𝛼" + 𝜆# +	𝛿*𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" + 𝛿0𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" ×𝐴𝑏" + 𝜃𝑋"# + 𝜀"#, 
where 𝛼"  is an individual fixed effect and 𝜆# is a time 
fixed effect in minute level. Same as our previous 
equation, our dependent variable 𝑌"#  is log(number of 
total votes+1) an individual i performed at minute t. 𝑃𝑜𝑙#  is a post-policy indicator. It is equal to 1 if t is 
greater than the policy implementation. 𝑇"  is an 
indicator for the individuals in the treatment group - 
people who had visited political articles. 𝑋"# controls for 
the focal articles each individual i was active on at 
minute t. 𝐴𝑏" is an abuser indicator - 1 if an individual i 
is marked as an abuser by the platform.  From the above 
specification, our difference-in-difference coefficient 𝛿* captures the effect of the platform’s policy on user 
activities in the focal ten articles while 𝛿*+ 𝛿0 captures 
the effect of the platform’s policy on abuser activities in 
the focal ten articles. 
One potential issue with the above specification in 
equation (1) is that it does not account for the difference 
in duration of the focal article visits each individual has. 
Users visit the focal article at a different time and the 
length of their stay in the focal article is also different. 
If there exist time trends based on the duration of the 
users, the previous model would not capture it. To 
handle this issue, we include individual-specific linear 
time trends: 
(2) 𝑌"# = 	𝛼" + 𝜆# +	𝛿*𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" + 𝛿0	𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" ×𝐴𝑏" + 𝛽𝑋"# + 𝜃"𝜏 + 𝜀"# 
where τ equals 1 if an individual i entered into the focal 
article and linearly increases by each minute. Here, 𝜃" controls the linear individual time trend. In other 
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words, we allow each individual to have different linear 
time trend after controlling for the individual and time 
fixed effects.     
Results from equation (1) are presented in Table 3 
column (1) and the results from equation (2) are 
presented in Table 3 column (2). As can be seen from 
both specifications, the policy implementation is 
significantly and positively correlated with the total 
number of voting for the regular users but negatively 
correlated with the voting activities of the abusers. The 
results under equation (2) suggest that the policy 
increases the regular user voting activities by 2.2% 
while decreasing the voting activities of the abusers by 
1.8%. This result implies that 1) the capping policy 
effectively restricts the behavior of the abusers, 2) 
expected utility under the policy outweighs the cost 
imposed by the policy for the regular users. As 
explained in our theoretical framework, it may occur 
from the increase in the perceived probability that user’s 
voting activities would better represent their opinion in 
the commenting system. This change in the perceived 
probability mainly comes from the expected decline in 
the abusive actions under the policy. 
 
Table 3. Results from DDD models  
Dependent 
Variable 
(1) 
Ln(vote+1) 
(2) 
Ln(vote+1) 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" 0.0156 *** (0.0059) 0.0219 ** (0.0099) 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" × 𝐴𝑏" -.0590 *** (0.0111) -0.0405 ** (0.0186) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 63,697 63,697 
R-Squared 0.4939 0.5803 
Individual FE YES YES 
Minute FE YES YES 
Individual Trend NO LINEAR 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.1.2. Heterogeneous effect by previous voting 
activities. Our results indicate that the change in 
expected utility under the policy outweighs the cost 
imposed by the policy for the regular users. It may occur 
from the change in the perceived probability that voting 
activities would better promote their opinion without the 
abusers. We examine further by dividing the regular 
users into two, one with previous voting activities and 
the other without previous voting activities. We argue 
that users who have been engaged in the voting activities 
have a better understanding of the magnitude of the 
malicious actions and have stronger beliefs on the 
accountability of the commenting system. Thus, we 
expect that the restrictive policy will reinforce the 
activities of regular users with previous voting 
activities.  
To test our hypothesis, we create an indicator 
variable based on the voting activities before they visit 
our focal articles.  As we only have information about 
the previous activities for the individuals who had 
visited the first political article and the first 
entertainment article (Political 1 and Entertainment 1), 
we limit our sample to these individuals. Also, as our 
goal for the analysis is to see the heterogeneous policy 
effect among the regular users, we exclude the 
individuals marked as abusers. Thus, our new sample 
for the analysis contains 34,108 individual-minute level 
observations from 3,689 regular users.  
We first estimate the effect of policy on the users 
separately based on the previous activities using 
difference-in-difference: 
(3) 𝑌"# = 	𝛼" + 𝜆# +	𝛿*𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" + 𝜀"#,    
where 𝛼"  is an individual fixed effect and 𝜆#  is a time 
fixed effect in minute level. Again, our dependent 
variable 𝑌"#  is log (number of total votes+1) an 
individual i performed at minute t. 𝑃𝑜𝑙# is a post-policy 
indicator. It is equal to 1 if t is greater than the policy 
implementation. 𝑇" is an indicator for the individuals in 
the treatment group. We divide our sample into two, one 
containing observations from the users without any 
previous activities and the other with observations from 
users with previous activities, and estimate using 
equation (3). 
We also estimate the heterogeneous effect by users’ 
previous activities using difference-in-difference-in-
difference estimation similar to equation (1):   
(4) 𝑌"# = 	𝛼" + 𝜆# +	𝛿*𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" + 𝛿0	𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" ×𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒" + 𝜀"#,          
where 𝛼"  is an individual fixed effect and 𝜆#  is a time 
fixed effect in minute level. Same as our previous 
equation, our dependent variable 𝑌"# is log (number of 
total votes+1) an individual i performed at minute t. 𝑃𝑜𝑙# is a post-policy indicator. It is equal to 1 if t is 
greater than the policy implementation. 𝑇"  is an 
indicator for the individuals in the treatment group, that 
is, people that had visited political articles. 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒"_i 
indicates for the users’ previous activities, where the 
indicator equals 1 if an individual i had been engaged in 
voting behavior before he/she visited our focal articles 
and 0 if an individual i had no previous activities.   
Table 4 shows the result from equation (3) and (4). 
Results on Table 4 column (1) and (2) show that the 
policy intervention increases voting activities of the 
overall users, regardless of their previous voting 
behavior. Results on Table 4 column (3) directly 
compare the impact of the policy intervention on users 
with previous voting experience and without previous 
voting experience. We can see that users who had been 
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engaged in voting activities before the focal article show 
greater increase in the number of voting after the 
treatment, and thus the results support our hypothesis 
that more attentive users are more likely to have a 
greater perception change in probability of voting a 
decisive vote.  
 
Table 4. Results of  
heterogeneous policy effects  
 
Sample 
(1) 
W/O 
activity 
(2) 
With 
activity 
(3) 
All sample 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" 0.0095 ** (0.0047) 0.0645 *** (0.0247) 0.0081 (0.0063) 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇"× 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 - - 0.0578 *** (0.0099) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Obs. 27,828 6,280 34,108 
R-Squared 0.4106 0.4227 0.4451 
Individual 
FE YES YES YES 
Minute FE YES YES YES 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.2. Random Utility Model 
 
Results from DDD models show strong evidence 
that policy intervention induces regular users’ 
behavioral changes. However, it has two limitations: the 
sample used in the DDD analysis is limited as we only 
include limited bandwidth of the time and individuals 
who had been engaged in voting activities during pre- 
and post-treatment periods. Also, it is still uncertain of 
what drove the behavioral changes of regular users. To 
overcome this issue, we propose a random utility model 
based on our conceptual framework described in Section 
3. 
 
5.2.1. Revisiting calculus of voting. To empirically 
examine the impact of restrictive policy on the regular 
users’ voting decisions, we revisit the rational voting 
model mentioned in the previous section: 
(5) 𝑈"? = 	𝑃"? × 𝐵"? + 𝐷" − 𝐶"?, 
where i indicates individual and c indicates comment. 
Again, an individual’s utility for voting a comment 
comes from the probability of one’s vote being decisive 𝑃"?, benefit from the comment being promoted/demoted 𝐵"?, satisfaction from voting 𝐷" and the cost of voting 𝐶"?. Unlike traditional elections, users in our context can 
vote only once per comment (upvote or downvote) and 
can vote across multiple comments. Thus, we assume 
that an individual has a different level of utility per 
comment. 
In our model, P is defined as a function of closeness, 
following the operationalization of Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968). We develop a closeness measure as 
the difference in netvotes between a comment and a 
comment ranked next [19]. As the platform displays 
comments based on the number of netvotes, this 
measure reflects the closeness of winning (moving to 
the upper ranking). When a user clicks a news article, 
the comments and the number of netvotes displayed 
below the article do not change unless the user refreshes 
the webpage. Thus, this variable varies by the individual 
user’s time of arrival to the focal article.  
We also include a policy indicator in our model. We 
code 1 if an individual i engaged in a voting activity on 
comment c under the policy intervention and 0 
otherwise. And we include an interaction term of policy 
indicator and closeness to empirically examine the 
impact of the capping policy on the perceived 
probability of being influential on the outcome. 
 
5.2.2. Random utility model. Drawing upon a random 
utility model, we rewrite the previous equation as:     
(6) 𝑈"? = 	𝛽𝑋" + 𝛼𝑍? + 𝛿𝑇"? + 𝜀"?, 
where 𝑈"?  is the ith individual’s expected utility of 
voting on comment c, 𝑋"  represents individual-level 
variables, 𝑍?  represents comment-level variables, and 𝑇"?  represents the variable of interest: closeness and 
policy indicator.  
Our observed outcome, 𝑦"? , represents the voting 
activity of an individual i on comment c and takes either 
one or zero. If a user had voted to the comment, 𝑦"? 
takes a value of 1, and 0 of one had not voted to the 
comment. Assuming a latent regression determines the 
observed outcome variable, we have a probability model 
of voting: 
(7) Pr(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 = 1|𝑋", 𝑍?, 𝑇"?) = 	Pr	(𝜀"? > −(𝛽𝑋" +𝛼𝑍? + 𝛿𝑇"?)) 
Using a simple linear probability model, we estimate 
the above equation and provide initial evidence for the 
validity of our conceptual model. We employ comment-
level fixed effects in terms of 𝑍?  and individual-level 
fixed effects and individual’s arrival time dummies (in 
30 minute interval) for 𝑋" . In our context, users can 
either upvote or downvote a comment but both, so we 
estimate the propensity of up-voting and down-voting, 
respectively. Further, we argue that ranking of the 
comment has an inevitable effect on user’s decision to 
vote, due to the platform’s design factor. Therefore, we 
also estimate the above equations separately by the 
ranking of each comment. We utilize the netvote 
distance from the ith ranked comment to the i-1th ranked 
comment as the closeness in the upvote estimation, and 
the netvote distance from the ith ranked comment to the 
i+1th ranked comment as the closeness in the downvote 
estimation. In the case of first-ranked comment, we 
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utilize the netvote distance to the second-ranked 
comment for both upvote and downvote analysis. We 
also include inverse ranking as a control variable in the 
full-sample analysis, and user’s previous voting counts 
and their device as controls in the analysis by ranking. 
To estimate the equation (7), we create a sample 
based on our second dataset. We include all the regular 
users who have visited political 1 article. As explained 
before, users with PC see 10 comments below the article 
and users with mobile devices see 5 comments below 
the article. Therefore, we include 5 individual-comment 
level observations for the mobile device users and 10 
individual-comment level observations for the PC users.  
The sample includes 2,282,672 observations from 
438,889 users.  
 
Table 5. Results from RUM 
Panel A : DV=Upvote 
 Closeness Policy Closeness× Policy 
All  -.0000003 (0.000000) 
0.59701*** 
(0.004154)  
All .00000008 (0.0000004) 
0.59718*** 
(0.00415) 
-.0000007* 
(0.0000004) 
Rank 1 -.000002 (0.0000049) 
0.77219*** 
(0.03407) 
-0.000074 
(0.0000661) 
Rank 2 .0000051* (0.0000026) 
0.62057*** 
(0.01368) 
-.000128*** 
(0.000018) 
Rank 3 .000005** (0.0000024) 
0.75085*** 
(0.01452) 
-.000227*** 
(0.00002) 
Rank 4 -.000022*** (0.000007) 
0.69746*** 
(0.01874) 
-.000258*** 
(0.000079) 
Rank 5 -.0000036 (0.000002) 
0.51897*** 
(0.01415) 
.000204*** 
(0.000032) 
Panel B : DV=Downvote 
 Closeness Policy Closeness× Policy 
All  .0000007*** (0.000000) 
0.24573*** 
(0.00248)  
All .0000003 (0.0000002) 
0.24551*** 
(0.002483) 
.0000006*** 
(0.0000002) 
Rank 1 -.0000052** (0.000002) 
0.17130*** 
(0.01472) 
-.000072** 
(0.000029) 
Rank 2 .0000014 (0.0000017) 
0.29541*** 
(0.007994) 
-.0000086 
(0.000013) 
Rank 3 -.0000009 (0.0000014) 
0.13142*** 
(0.00638) 
0.00007** 
(0.000027) 
Rank 4 .00000093 (0.000001) 
0.14457*** 
(0.00648) 
-.000057*** 
(0.000014) 
Rank 5 -.0000008 (0.0000008) 
0.21524*** 
(0.00653) 
0.000011*** 
(0.000004) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 reports results from 7 separate analysis 
based on equation (7). As mentioned before, panel A 
uses upvote as the dependent variable, and panel B uses 
downvote as the dependent variable. In upvoting 
decisions, we can see from column (3) that as netvote 
distance from the focal comment to the comment ranked 
above gets smaller, regular users are more likely to vote 
‘like’ after the policy implementation in the most 
analysis. Also, by comparing the estimates of the main 
effect and the interaction effect, we support our 
theoretical model that users are more likely to vote when 
the distance between the focal comment and the 
previous comment gets smaller, that is, one’s vote 
becomes more decisive. In the analysis of ranking 5, we 
find a contrary effect. Although more investigation is 
needed, we suspect that it is due to the platform’s 
commenting system design, that only the top five 
comments are seen in the news article page without any 
clicks.  
In the downvote analysis, the results are not easily 
explainable. Some of the interaction estimates are 
positive, while the others are negative. There may be 
several explanations: First, the underlying mechanism 
of the voting decision may be different in the ‘disliking’ 
situation as the traditional voting decision framework 
we employ focuses on the voting decision in the 
elections – more similar to ‘liking’ the candidate than 
‘disliking’. Second, in this initial study, we do not 
control for the valence of the comments and the users, 
and these may have a more significant effect on 
downvotes than the upvotes. 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications  
 
With the growing attention on online manipulation, 
many online platforms have imposed or considering to 
impose the policies to control malicious behavior. This 
paper plans to empirically examine the efficacy of the 
online platform's policy measure to meaningful 
behavioral changes of abusers and regular users, 
respectively. Our results show that the policy has an 
asymmetric effect on abusive users and regular users – 
while it effectively reduces the actions of the abusers by 
1.8%, it promotes the activities of the regular users by 
2.2%. We also find that the policy increases the 
activities of the regular users, regardless of their 
previous voting activities. We also draw from rational 
voting decision theory and show some initial evidence 
that the capping policy reinforces the perceived 
probability of being influential on the outcome in the 
upvote actions. 
 Our results add to the current literature of fake 
information and online opinion manipulation and the 
effectiveness of the platform’s input policies to restrain 
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the manipulative activities on the regular user. To the 
extent, reports from the social network platforms and 
popular press have documented the potential negative 
consequences of such a restrictive policy on the users' 
activities. However, our results and findings indicate 
that the platform's simple input control policy 
suppresses only the activities of the abusers and instead 
increases the activities of the regular users. Further, our 
research applies the voting decision framework to the 
online user behavior by empirically investigating the 
voting activities in the online political news platform. 
Online voting has an interesting feature—real-time 
display of closeness—and thus this study will provide 
new insights on the impact of closeness on voting 
decisions on online platforms where a voter can observe 
their actual closeness measure at the time of their voting 
decision.  
This research also provides meaningful managerial 
implications. Our results show that an activity-capping 
policy may be an alternative to abuser detection and 
suspension for many online communicating platforms, 
review sites and news platforms utilizing users votes on 
the popularity of the contents, Capping policy reduces 
abusers’ influence on public opinion by inducing more 
participation from the regular users. This study shows 
that a simple, easily implementable deterrence policy 
can mitigate abusive actions while promoting user 
discussion and opinion exchanges on the online news 
platforms. 
 
7. References  
 
[1] Anderson, E. T., and Simester, D. I. 2014. “Reviews 
Without a Purchase: Low Ratings, Loyal Customers, and 
Deception,” Journal of Marketing Research (51:3), pp. 249-
269. 
[2] Badawy, A., Ferrara, E., and Lerman, C. 2018. “Analyzing 
the Digital Traces of Political Manipulation: The 2016 Russian 
Interference Twitter Campaign,” IEEE/ACM International 
Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and 
Mining (ASONAM), Barcelona, Spain: pp. 258-265.  
[3] Banerjee, S., and Chua, A. Y. K. 2014. “A study of 
manipulative and authentic negative reviews,” Proceedings of 
the International Conference on Ubiquitous Information 
Management and Communication (8), pp. 1-6. 
[4] Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. 2004. “How 
Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences 
Estimates?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249-
275. 
[5] Forelle, M., Howard., P., Monroy-Hernandez., A., and 
Savage, S. 2014. “Political Bots and the Manipulation of 
Public Opinion in Venezuela,” Working paper.  
[6] Gelman, A., King, G., and Boscardin, J. 1998. “Estimating 
the Probability of Events that Have Never Occurred: When Is 
Your Vote Decisive?” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 93, pp. 1–9.  
[7] Grinberg, N., Joseph, K., Friedland, L., Swire-Thompson, 
B., and Lazer, D. 2019. “Fake News on Twitter During the 
2016 U.S. Presidential Election,” Science, 363(6425), 374-
378.  
[8] Hern, A., and Safi,M. (2019, January 21). “WhatsApp puts 
limit on message forwarding to fight fake news,” The 
Guardian.  
[9] Jindal, N., and Liu, B. 2008. “Opinion spam and analysis,” 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Web Search 
and Data Mining, pp. 219-230. 
[10] Kollanyi, B., Howard, P. N., and Woolley, S. C. 2016. 
“Bots and Automation over Twitter during the First US 
Presidential Debate,” Project on Computational Propaganda. 
[11] Kumar, N., Venugopal, D., Qiu, L., and Kumar, S. 2018. 
“Detecting Review Manipulation on Online Platforms with 
Hierarchical Supervised Learning,” Journal of Management 
Information Systems (35:1), pp. 350-380. 
[12] Kumar, S., and Shah, N. 2018. “False Information on 
Web and Social Media: A Survey,” Social Media Analytics: 
Advances and Applications, CRC press. 
[13] Lacy, D., and Burden, B. 1999. “The Vote-Stealing and 
Turnout Effects of Ross Perot in the 1992 U.S. Presidential 
Election,” American Journal of Political Science, 43(1), 233-
255. doi:10.2307/2991792 
[14] Lappas, T., Sabnis, G., and Valkanas, G. 2016. “The 
impact of fake reviews on online visibility: A vulnerability 
assessment of the hotel industry,” Information Systems 
Research (27:4), pp. 940-961. 
[15] Lynn, M. 1991. Scarcity effects on value: A quantitative 
review of the commodity theory literature[Electronic version]. 
Retrieved from Cornell University, School of Hospitality  
[16] Ma, M., and Agarwal, R. 2007. “Through a glass darkly: 
information technology design, identity verification, and 
knowledge contribution in online communities,” Information 
Systems Research (18:1), pp. 42-67. 
[17] Mayzlin, D., Dover, Y., and Chevalier, J. 2014. 
“Promotional reviews: An empirical investigation of online 
review manipulation,” American Economic Review (104:8), 
pp. 2421-2455. 
[18] Muchnik, L., Aral, S., and Taylor, S. J. 2013. “Social 
influence bias: A randomized experiment,” Science, 
341(6146), 647-651. 
[19] Riker, W. H., and Ordeshook, P. 1968. “A Theory of the 
Calculus of Voting,” American Political Science Review 
(62:25). 
[20] Shanahan, M. K.  2017.  Journalism, Online Comments, 
and the Future of Public Discourse, Routledge. 
[21] Shao, C., Ciampaglia, G. L., Varol, O., Yang, K. C., 
Flammini, A., and Menczer, F. 2018. “The spread of low-
credibility content by social bots,” Nature communications, 
9(1), 4787. 
[22] Stoddard, G. 2015. Popularity and quality in social news 
aggregators: A study of reddit and hacker news. In WWW. 
[23] Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., and Aral, S. 2018. “The Spread of 
True and False News Online,” Sience (MAR 2018), pp. 1146-
1151. 
[24] Wolfinger R., and Rosenstone, S. 1980. Who Votes? Yale 
University Press.  
[25] Wooldridge, J. (2007). What's New in Econometrics? 
Lecture 10 Difference-in-Differences Estimation. 
 
Page 3990
